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Authors are not responsible for the cover designs of their books, and for every 
cover proudly posted on campus office doors or Facebook pages, some smaller 
number have been greeted with a vague sense of disappointment. Within the 
historical profession, of course, dust jackets matter little; we all understand 
that complexities of historical argument are not easily translated into visual 
design, and in any case we know better than to judge a book by its cover. 
Nonetheless, the best place to start making sense of these two identically titled 
books may be with their covers.
The dust jackets of both Kathleen Frydl’s and Glenn Altschuler and Stuart 
Blumin’s versions of The GI Bill picture soldiers returning from war. Altschuler 
and Blumin’s veterans are the AP photo version, jubilant men crowded onto 
the deck of a transport ship, grinning and waving as they pull into dock. The 
Signal Corps photograph on Frydl’s book portrays a different homecoming, 
the men somber, no more than silhouettes, dark shapes in helmets and heavy 
packs, rifles evident, heads bowed, trudging single file down the gangplank 
to shore. The black-and-white photograph on Altschuler and Blumin’s book 
is embedded in patriotism, the book’s title rendered in red, white, and blue, 
a strip of full-color U.S. flag running along the cover’s top edge. The black-
and-white photograph that fills Frydl’s cover is washed, top to bottom, in 
dark, murky green. In one way, the covers’ different promises are fulfilled: 
the first book is forthright and generally celebratory, a straightforward work 
with little irony and no hidden layers. The second is full of ambivalence and 
ambiguity. But in a more fundamental way, these images are misleading. For 
in The GI Bills of Frydl, Altschuler, and Blumin, war offers only the most 
distant of contexts.
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The GI Bill is an American icon, one of the key stories of bipartisan domestic 
triumph in twentieth century U.S. history. In popular memory, the story of the 
GI Bill is a story of success, of a program created in gratitude, meant to offer 
some partial repayment of the nation’s debt to those who had sacrificed to 
defend their country in a difficult but necessary war. By any account, its reach 
was vast: GI Bill unemployment benefits smoothed the often difficult transition 
from military service to civilian life for millions of those demobilized at the 
end of World War II. GI Bill education benefits helped more than two million 
veterans attend college or begin postgraduate programs and an additional 
5.6 million to enroll in some form of job training or certificate program. (The 
Bill’s education provision alone cost the nation more than the Marshall Plan 
to reconstruct Europe in the years following the war.) GI Bill loan guarantees 
made it possible for four million veterans to buy homes on extremely favor-
able terms and for others to secure farmland or to start businesses. By 1955, 78 
percent of the nation’s military veterans had benefitted directly from at least 
one provision of the GI Bill. That translates into 12.4 million people—roughly 
one in thirteen of all living Americans, or one for every four U.S. households. 
The opportunities offered through the GI Bill, millions of Americans could 
claim, had changed their lives. One can make a strong argument that it also 
changed the lives of their families for generations to come. 
Note to academic publishers: these two works make the case that a good 
historical topic isn’t exhausted by one book. Both versions of The GI Bill are 
worthwhile, but they are profoundly different from one another and will find 
different audiences. Altschuler and Blumin’s GI Bill is, as its title suggests, a 
history of the GI Bill. Frydl’s GI Bill is a political analysis of state development 
and capacity that centers on the creation and implementation of the GI Bill. 
Altschuler and Blumin’s book is part of the Oxford University Press “Pivotal 
Moments in American History” series; Frydl’s is a Cambridge University Press 
monograph that incorporates a lengthy review of literature and has footnotes 
at the bottom of the page. The first book is by two senior scholars, historians 
well in command of broader context and historical form, writers who know 
how to focus in on the telling quote or perfect story and use it to advantage; 
they mean this work to be read by people who aren’t professional historians 
as well as those who are. The second is an ambitious dissertation-turned-book, 
exhaustively researched and close to its topic, somewhat carelessly edited and 
proofread, still full of excess detail, and with the occasional key point buried in 
the middle of a paragraph. The first will be useful in undergraduate classrooms. 
The second is likely to prompt some changes in historians’ conversations.
Both of these books are shaped, in part, by the GI Bill’s iconic weight. 
In writing her introduction, Frydl felt it necessary to distinguish between 
“idolizing” (bad) and “honoring” (good) the bill, while the introduction to 
Altschuler and Blumin’s more conventionally positive assessment of the bill 
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and its legacy begins with a photograph of a museum display case containing 
a handwritten draft of the American Legion’s proposed “Bill of Rights for GI 
Joe and GI Jane” and concludes with a promise to “take the bill outside of its 
shrine” (p. 9). More significantly for readers of the RAH, however, these two 
versions of The GI Bill address the too-easy summoning of the GI Bill in history 
textbooks and other historical analyses. Throughout the past several decades 
historians have often used the GI Bill as a kind of shorthand—almost deus ex 
machina—explanation for the emergence of a rapidly growing middle class in 
the years following World War II. More recently, historians have held the GI 
Bill responsible for strengthening and consolidating inequalities in postwar 
American society. The index to Lizabeth Cohen’s A Consumer’s Republic, for 
example, reads as follows: “GI Bill of Rights (Servicemen’s Readjustment Act; 
1944), . . . and discrimination against African Americans, . . . and discrimina-
tion against women, . . . and discrimination against working class, . . . home 
ownership and, . . .”1 There is much truth to these claims, all authors agree, 
both those of possibility and social transformation and those of discrimina-
tion and foreclosed opportunity. And both works, in different ways, reconcile 
these divergent stories by demonstrating that nothing is quite that simple. As 
Frydl writes of her analysis: “The inability to present a simplified story is not 
a fault; our desire for one is” (p. 35).
And Frydl’s story is not simple, in part because she forces an analysis of 
state development into a narrative structure more suited to an overview of 
the GI Bill. Frydl’s primary goal is (in sociologist Theda Skocpol’s phrase) to 
“bring the state back in” to our purposeful tellings and retellings of the his-
tory of the GI Bill, and her history of state development is, like much current 
political history, influenced by the political science and sociological analysis of 
the past several decades.2 Although Frydl’s work is unapologetically historical 
(her claim to have worked “systematically” and “seriously” with the records 
of the Veterans Administration is no exaggeration), she nonetheless turns from 
the specificity of history to offer a model—the “two opposing ideal-types” of 
Rome and Athens—to make her case about the “logics of state power.” She 
describes an “inward-looking” Athenian state that located authority in local 
communities and resisted the creation of centralized power. In times of war, 
the men of Athens fought as citizens and returned as citizens; they received 
no special status or rewards, and while the burden they bore was severe, it 
was also equitable and occasional. Rome, in her contrast, was an activist state, 
looking outward to conquest and competition. Its veterans were distinguished 
from other citizens, and the state offered “rewards for service . . . under a 
model of citizenship that compelled a citizen to do less and featured a state 
that did much more” (pp. 39–41). Athens, here, has notable parallels to an 
ideal republic; Rome to a liberal state.
199BaiLeY  /  Losing the War
Frequently calling upon these ideal types, Frydl traces the logic of state 
power and of citizenship that shaped struggles over the creation and imple-
mentation of the GI Bill. She is arguing, in part, that the major expansion of 
the state does not come in the New Deal or even during World War II, but 
instead in the postwar years when “a tremendous reordering of political 
power” underwrote a major expansion of the federal government. For Frydl, 
the GI Bill signals that transformation of state power, even if it was a “stilted, 
ungraceful, and often unconscious transformation” (pp. 10, 70).
Frydl’s analysis centers on the role of Congress. What are the consequences, 
she asks, of relying on congressional stewardship of federal power, of allowing 
Congress to play “broker” in the “‘uneasy state’”?3 Her tale is of the devolu-
tion of authority to state and local institutions; while it is the modern state 
that makes the GI Bill possible, she argues, the bill wears a variety of masks 
that obscure the expansion of state power. Frydl’s is also an intersecting story 
of complex and intertwined political battles. As the American Legion makes 
an argument of obligation, claiming that veterans have earned benefits that 
distinguish them from other citizens, conservatives scheme to prevent the cre-
ation of a new, broadly based federal entitlement program and emphasize the 
short-term needs for postwar “readjustment.” The resulting program, restricted 
to veterans, could be legitimately located in the Veteran’s Administration—an 
agency whose federal status was fairly easily obscured and, most significantly, 
one whose immensely limited capacity essentially assured that the bill’s provi-
sions would be implemented by state and local agencies. This decision limited 
the supervisory power of the federal government and virtually guaranteed 
that the color-blind language of the GI Bill was subordinate to local politics 
and culture. In other words, implementation mattered. 
Somewhat perplexingly, given her arguments that “a federalist geography of 
power” allowed states to maintain oppressive racial hierarchies and her conclu-
sion that the GI Bill offered an impressive social welfare system for veterans 
and their families at the expense of more universal coverage, Frydl deems the 
GI Bill a “brilliant bargain,” the “result of a dialectic between two traditions 
that achieved a stunningly effective compromise” (pp. 31, 145). While the Bill 
does show what she calls “a genuine claim to both of the political traditions 
supporting either federal or local governance,” it is, in the end, not necessarily 
a success—except in relation to Frydl’s realistic beginning point: it is not so 
much that those in power did not create a universal welfare state, but “that 
it came at all, for anyone and however briefly” (pp. 145, 24).
Glenn Atlschuler and Stuart Blumin offer a brief, readable, and fairly 
comprehensive overview of the GI Bill: its place in the long history of veter-
ans’ policy; the story of its creation and amendment; its implementation and 
use (focusing on education and home ownership); and, finally, its impact on 
American society. More than anything else, their argument is summed up by 
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the series title: the GI Bill marks a “Pivotal Moment in American History.” 
They emphasize the uniqueness of the GI Bill: in scale, in sweep, and in its 
fundamental break from previous policies toward returning veterans. By 
looking at “attempts to deal with the specific question of what to do about 
veterans—the able bodied, as well as the ill and wounded—,” they write, “we 
learn much about what the U.S. government could and would do at various 
stages of our past”; and their discussion of the ways in which the successes 
and failures of each war’s policy shaped the debate over policy in the next is 
one of the most compelling parts of this work (p. 12). 
While Altschuler and Blumin posit a “pivotal moment,” they also portray a 
bill that “grew in fits and starts,” a bill whose significance was not recognized 
at the time (not a single editorial appeared in the nation’s major newspapers). 
Their GI Bill is both a “stunning instance of congressional wisdom and good-
will” and a sweeping, substantive bill that became so in large part because 
no one in Congress had a clue how its different provisions would be used 
or—critically—how much it would cost (p. 12). The GI Bill that FDR signed 
into law on June 22, 1944, they argue, was primarily a safety net, meant to 
help ease veterans’ transition to civilian life and to manage the rate at which 
demobilized soldiers attempted to reenter the job market in an economy shifting 
from super-heightened war-production mode to some form of normality. In 
addition to unemployment compensation, the initial version of the Bill offered 
the benefits that made it both “unique” and “pivotal”—education, mortgage 
guarantees, loan guarantees for businesses and farms—but at levels that made 
the GI Bill, according to one critic, “meaningless.” In the year following the 
bill’s signing, fewer than 10,000 veterans had bought homes with VA-backed 
loans; less than one percent of demobilized veterans had used educational 
benefits. And as the VA loan officers held to common standards in which 
credit history trumped war record, officials had approved only four-tenths 
of one percent of veterans’ applications for business loans. In 1945, what had 
begun as a temporary readjustment measure with a “shaky start” was revised 
and recast, as Congress enacted a series of amendments that transformed the 
safety net into “an engine of opportunity for millions of young veterans” (pp. 
8, 6). The remainder of the book traces these programs of opportunity, offering 
fascinating stories and statistics as well as balanced assessment.
Altschuler and Blumin’s overview is well-crafted, explaining the struggles 
that animated debates about the GI Bill and placing them in longer historical 
context. And while Frydl illuminates the structural imperatives of certain forms 
of political and administrative organization, these historians attempt to make 
clear what assumptions people at that moment in history were working with, 
and within—assumptions about race and gender, about war and sacrifice, 
about the proper roles of government and, in general, about how the world 
works. In moves that will be valuable in the classroom, they attempt to lead 
201BaiLeY  /  Losing the War
readers in that complex form of historical analysis: to consider how we, in 
the present, can understand the varying ways that people in history saw their 
world, and their options, and then move to judgment.
Though the authors of these two books never intended them to be the 
subject of a compare-and-contrast essay, reading them in conjunction is 
somewhere between frustrating and fascinating. The careful reader may find 
some inconsistencies, including the insignificant but amusing difference in 
one story they both tell. In June 1945, a congressional conference committee 
was working to reconcile House and Senate versions of the amended bill. On 
June 9, 1945, with the final vote scheduled for the following morning, the 
committee was tied, three to three, with Representative John Gibson absent, 
back in his Georgia district seeking treatment for illness (Altschuler and Blu-
min) “due to a reported illness, but really there to ‘mend political fences’” 
(Frydl, p. 143). In Altschuler and Blumin’s version, the Georgia congressman 
is intercepted as he returns from a doctor’s appointment; in Frydl’s, repeated 
appeals broadcast over local radio stations finally reach Gibson, who is play-
ing poker at a truck stop.
Despite their different goals and purposes, the two GI Bills share major 
questions. Most fundamentally, both recontextualize the Bill, shifting focus 
from the war that gave it birth to the ongoing reform struggles begun in the 
New Deal. Like other historians, they ask whether the GI Bill was a victory 
or a loss for progressive reform. Frydl is most insistent on the reform-based 
origins of the bill. She emphasizes FDR’s ongoing attempts to create a broad 
program of social welfare that encompassed all citizens, persuasively quoting 
his 1933 statement before the American Legion convention that “no person, 
because he wore a uniform, must thereafter be placed in a special class of 
beneficiaries over and above all other citizens,” documenting his desire to 
house a rehabilitation service for both disabled veterans and civilians injured 
in war-production work in the Federal Security Administration, and then trac-
ing Truman’s efforts to rekindle broader programs of social reform as he took 
charge of the grieving nation (p. 53). Frydl’s conclusions about the bill’s legacy 
for social welfare policy are mixed. A “costly and generous” social welfare state 
was created by the GI Bill, she argues, for the almost half of all Americans who 
were, by 1960, either veterans or members of a veteran’s family. Frydl’s GI 
Bill helped forge a powerful central state, but because it was based on notions 
of veterans’ exceptionalism and because it “tacitly” repudiated central power 
and “executive civilian social policy,” the bill also made it more difficult to 
extend such benefits to citizens who were not veterans (p. 359).
Altschuler and Blumin also see the failure of progressive goals, though 
their ultimate conclusions are more positive. They trace FDR’s recasting of 
political tactics and objectives, situating his claims that the nation has a special 
obligation to veterans (“we, at home, owe a special and continuing obliga-
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tion to these men and women in the armed services”) within the president’s 
broader vision of inclusive reform. In many ways, theirs is a “rising tide” sort 
of argument. “It might not be entirely accurate to say that the New Dealers 
had lost the battle but won the war,” they write, but because the GI Bill made 
it possible “to apply the powers and resources of the federal government . . . 
with less controversy and less restraint,” the “extent to which the lives of all 
Americans and not merely the nation’s veterans were changed vindicated 
their fondest hopes” (p. 83).
Race is central to both works, and, for both, race is where the GI Bill fails 
on its own, egalitarian terms. Though African Americans and Latinos were as 
fully entitled to benefits as white veterans, they faced much greater obstacles, 
from racial segregation and discrimination in higher education to a much lower 
high-school graduation rate that left black veterans less able to take advantage 
of education benefits; from the practice of “redlining,” which worked to deny 
loans for houses in primarily African American or mixed-race neighborhoods, 
to the individual racial prejudices of VA officials. While fully acknowledging the 
weight of racial discrimination and the ways in which decentralized authority 
allowed local discriminatory practices, Altschuler and Blumin also acknowl-
edge the more complicated landscape of race and ethnicity in the immediate 
postwar era. Focusing on universities, they document the ways in which the 
GI Bill fostered broader access across lines of ethnicity, class, and religion: by 
1952, they note, 25 percent of Harvard students were Jewish (Yale resisted 
such changes). As students were drawn from much broader backgrounds, they 
argue, the GI Bill offered a “‘living laboratory’ in which to test assumptions 
about whether ‘average Americans’ could make the most” of the opportunity 
for higher education (p. 147). In the same context, Altschuler and Blumin 
discuss female veterans and the GI Bill, attributing women’s much lower use 
of benefits to an “ideology of domestic containment” (p. 123).
Frydl largely ignores gender, class, and ethnicity; her larger argument about 
federal power and state authority in an age of Jim Crow predisposes her to 
focus on a black-and-white world. In this context, Frydl carefully weighs the 
impact of the GI Bill on African Americans, and her conclusions are mixed. 
While the GI Bill was egalitarian in nature, making no distinctions of race, 
gender, or rank, it functioned as many proponents of VA control and decentral-
ization had wished: “community-based administration empowered the forces of 
institutional racism” (p. 223). Nonetheless, she insists, an account that focuses 
solely on discrimination would miss the “confidence, racial solidarity,” and 
“resilient determination to capitalize on those opportunities,” however lim-
ited, shown by many black veterans (p. 223). In her telling, African Americans 
incorporated their experiences with the GI Bill, both positive and negative, 
into their political understandings, and those experiences helped to shape 
the civil rights movement that emerged powerfully in the decade to come. 
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Despite her cautiously positive take on African American agency and the GI 
Bill, Frydl has a larger claim to make. Moving beyond current understandings 
that blacks were often excluded from government social policy programs, she 
claims that “racism influenced the institutional setting of American political 
development” (p. 25). In their attempt to preserve segregation and to maintain 
racial hierarchies by limiting African American access to benefits the GI Bill 
offered all veterans, she argues, congressional representatives “reinvented 
the administrative discretion once available to states in the absence of federal 
power for an age of massive central government” (p. 25). 
The topic of scandal provides another dividing point. Altschuler and Blu-
min discuss contemporary reports that found widespread fraud and misuse, 
especially in the Title II sub-college training where new schools came and 
went, taking advantage of “easy money” and veterans’ desire for a subsistence 
allowance with little effort in return. However, in the sort of move common 
to social historians who are attempting to use the reports of social workers or 
police officers to understand “deviant” sexual behaviors, they emphasize that 
the reports must also be read as documents shaped by the common “ideologi-
cal currents,” class prejudices, and assumptions about gender and race of that 
time. Frydl takes the evidence of fraud and abuse much more seriously, even 
(in another model-focused approach) calling for historians to pay more atten-
tion to the predictive field of “scandalology.” One-third of the $14.5 billion 
allocated to GI Bill education benefits, she reports, went to fictional schools, 
“on-the-job training hoaxes,” or to legitimate institutions overcharging the 
government. Frydl is not quick to condemn the veterans who perpetrated 
fraud; misuse of benefits likely indicated that veterans would have preferred 
a cash bonus to the opportunities offered, she concludes, and in any case 
the funds—no matter how obtained—likely made their transition to civilian 
life less difficult. Her larger point, however, is that Americans worried little 
about the prevalent fraud and abuse in the GI Bill, while they were quick to 
condemn fraud and abuse in other social welfare programs such as Aid to 
Dependent Children.
Writing of public reluctance to “denounce the fraud perpetuated by veter-
ans using the GI Bill,” Frydl concludes that reluctance likely “stemmed from 
the demographic profile of the guilty party” (p. 200). I thought I knew where 
she was going: in the aftermath of World War II, many Americans would 
hesitate to denounce those who had fought a brutal and life-destroying war, 
no matter that the “chicken-sexing” courses they signed up for were largely 
a scam. After all, the public had been willing to blame the spread of venereal 
disease during the war on loose women, rather than servicemen. But Frydl 
writes, instead: “Who really rushed to condemn a very large group of mostly 
male and mostly white people,” a group to whom “race and gender codes” 
gave “social standing” (p. 200)? Without in any way dismissing the power 
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of racial (and gender) discrimination in postwar America, it is also possible 
to observe that in a nation that was 89 percent white and in many places 
racially homogeneous, in a nation that had emerged from four years of total 
war, other divisions might matter. Race is a powerful explanation for much, 
but not all, of American history. 
What’s missing here is World War II. Though the United States suffered 
much less than most combatant nations, war’s disruptions and losses had 
reached into the lives of its citizens. Americans had lived for years with con-
stant reminders, both official and deeply personal, about the sacrifices of “our 
boys.” The majority of veterans never saw combat, but the broader under-
standing of service and sacrifice—and their reality—was a powerful cultural 
context for the creation and reception of the GI Bill. Both works make nods 
in that direction—Frydl’s the more interesting, Altschuler and Blumin’s the 
more consistent—but neither work truly explores the war’s critical meaning. 
In turning our attention to political struggles and liberal hopes, to structural 
implications and economic outcomes, to the implementation and use of the bill, 
these books offer important correctives to the too-simple understandings that 
have structured popular memories and historical analyses alike. Nonetheless, 
I wish they had not so completely lost the war.
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